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The last fifty years have witnessed the rapid development of
an implied warranty1 protection for purchasers of new homes. 2
In seeking to better protect the new home buyer3 the courts
have largely discarded the long-criticized 4 common-law doctrine
of caveat emptor.5 Ironically, this trend may only have suc-
ceeded in replacing one inequity with another. With the buyer
now protected by sweeping remedies for an imperfect bargain,
1. Courts adopting a theory of implied warranty as a basis for imposing liability on
vendors of new homes have described the protection in a number of ways, including
fitness for habitation, F & S Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963), fitness
for habitation and workmanlike construction, Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo. 78, 388
P.2d 399 (1964), workmanlike construction, Whaley v. Milton Constr. & Supply Co., 241
S.W.2d 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951), fitness for intended use and reasonably good and work-
manlike construction, McKeever v. Mercaldo, 3 Pa. D. & C. 2d 188 (1954), and fitness for
purpose and workmanlike construction, Harrison v. Heagy, 81 Dauph. Co. 7, ex sust. 82
Dauph. Co. 19 (1963). For purposes of this Note, the various denotations will be treated
under the broader topic of implied warranties, unless otherwise noted.
2. Of the forty-one jurisdictions that recognize some form of implied warranty pro-
tection, thirty-seven have done so by judicial decision. See Shedd, The Implied War-
ranty of Habitability-New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 303-
306 (1980). Two states, Maryland and Louisiana, have recognized an implied warranty
by statute. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203 (MicHas 1981); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts.
2520 et seq. (West 1952)(incorporating the civil-law doctrine of redhibition). Only two
states, Georgia and Virginia, have rejected implied warranty protection. The remaining
eight-Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Wisconsin-have not yet addressed the issue. See Shedd, supra, at 303-306.
However, even those states that still adhere to caveat emptor will use other methods
to protect the new home buyer. See, e.g., Holmes v. Worthey, 159 Ga. App. 262, 282
S.E.2d 919 (1981) (allowing buyer to bring an action against vendor-builder on a theory of
negligence), af'd, 249 Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d 9 (1982); McNamara, The Implied Warranty
in New House Construction: Has the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor Been Abolished? 1
REAL EST. L.J. 43, 46-47 (1972).
3. Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969 & Supp. 1978). See Note, The Implied Warranty
of Habitability in North Carolina Revisited, 58 N.C.L. Rv. 1055 (1980).
4. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in the Sale of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 VAmD. L. REV. 541 (1961).
5. "Let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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has the seller been left defenseless?
This Note examines the historical development of the im-
plied warranty doctrine and the status of potential defenses.
Conclusions drawn from this examination suggest that the ven-
dor of new homes has, in recent years, become a virtual insurer
of new home quality.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
A. In General
The doctrine of caveat emptor dominated sales of new
homes in both the United States and England well into the
twentieth century.6 This common-law doctrine was premised on
the transaction's arm-length nature and the parties' supposedly
equal bargaining position.7 Presumably, the buyer had both the
opportunity and the means to inspect the property prior to
purchase.8 Thus, if the circumstances accompanying the transac-
tion gave rise to suspicion, the buyer theoretically could negoti-
ate an express warranty with the seller." Until the 1930s these
antecedent safeguards were the buyer's only protection. A dis-
satisfied purchaser usually had no remedy because the seller en-
joyed a near-absolute defense under caveat emptor.10
Sellers also enjoyed an equally formidable defense in the
common-law doctrine of merger. Under this rule, the sales con-
tract merged into the deed accepted by the buyer. The deed's
provisions governed in the event problems arose, and the fre-
quent absence of specific contractual covenants regarding home
6. Note, supra note 3, at 1055.
7. See Note, Adopting the Implied Warranty of Habitability to Define Substantial
Performance in the Sale of New Homes, 20 URB. L. ANN. 247 (1980). For a discussion of
the development of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor,
40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
8. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 836-37 (1967).
9. See Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 642 (1965).
10. Under caveat emptor the buyer was protected from fraudulent nondisclosure.
To recover damages under this theory, the buyer was required to prove that the seller
was aware of the defect at the time of sale. Id. at 644.
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warranties often left the purchaser without a remedy.11 Modern
realty practices aggravated the obvious inequities of the merger
and caveat emptor doctrines.12 These inequities ultimately
prompted courts to recognize an implied warranty as a means of
protecting the new home buyer."3
B. In England
An implied warranty in new home sales was first recognized
in the 1931 English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd.
14
There a newly finished house was made uninhabitable by seep-
age. The buyer brought an action against the seller, and the
court awarded the buyer damages under an express warranty
theory. 15 The decision's true significance, however, is found in
the following dicta:
[I]t is a matter of very little moment whether there was or
whether there was not an express warranty as to the condition
of the material or the nature of the workmanship which should
be used in this house, because ... it is plain from the whole of
the facts of the case that the law will imply a warranty that the
house which was to be built by the defendants for the plaintiff
should be a house which was habitable and fit for human be-
ings to live in."6
This sentence eventually became the supporting authority for
the American adoption of the implied warranty theory.
17
The Miller dicta was extended to cover sales of substan-
tially completed homes in Perry v. Sharon Development Co.18
The apparent rationale behind these decisions was that the
11. Note, supra note 7, at 250.
12. The post-World War 11 housing boom led to a new class of participants in real
estate sales: builder-vendors. This housing boom was the result of an increased demand
for housing, a demand that also contributed to the large number of vendors who pur-
chased new houses in haste without a proper inspection. Bearman, supra note 4, at 542.
13. Note, supra note 3, at 1056. Only Georgia and Virginia still adhere to caveat
emptor in new home sales. Shedd, supra note 2, at 303-306. See Holmes v. Worthey, 159
Ga. App. 262, 282 S.E.2d 919 (1981), ajfd, 249 Ga. 104, 287 S.E.2d 9 (1982); Bruce
Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978).
14. [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
15. Note, supra note 7, at 251 n.20.
16. [1931] 2 K.B. at 120.
17. Shedd, supra note 2, at 294.
18. 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A. 1937).
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buyer's reliance on the builder's expertise was more pronounced
in the sale of an uncompleted home because the buyer was una-
ble to make an inspection. Thus, the buyer was at the seller's
mercy, a problem the implied warranty was designed to rem-
edy."' The unfairness of the English Rule, as it became known,
was that the purchaser of a completed home was denied similar
protection.2
C. In the United States
Initially, American courts were unresponsive to the English
implied warranty theory. As in England, the doctrine of caveat
emptor was firmly entrenched in this country and continued to
remain the near universal rule2' despite strong arguments from
aggrieved buyers. 22 Nevertheless, the housing boom that fol-
lowed World War II added new impetus to the movement to-
ward implied warranty protection.23 The drastically increased
housing demand led to a significant reduction in the quality of
new homes. Low quality housing flourished in the post war
seller's market because home buyers were purchasing in haste
with little desire or opportunity to inspect the property. Though
no remedy was available at law, aggrieved buyers turned to the
courts for assistance.
24
American courts did not begin to view the implied warranty
as a plausible solution to the buyer's predicament until the late
1950s. In the landmark decision Vanderschrier v. Aaron,25 the
Ohio Court of Appeals became the first American court to adopt
the English rationale for an implied warranty.2 As in the En-
19. Note, supra note 7, at 251 n.21.
20. Id. at 251.
21. Louisiana, with its civil-law doctrine of redhibition, was the sole exception. See
supra note 2.
22. See Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitility (pt. 2), 47 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1 (1970);
Note, Warranties in the Uniform Land Transactions Act of 1975-Progression or Ret-
rogression for Pennsylvania? 49 TZAip. L.Q. 162 (1975). Buyers advanced common argu-
ments with mixed success, including- (1) negligent construction by the builder; (2) fraud
or misrepresentation; and (3) failure of the builder to notify the buyer of potential harm.
See Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1962); Shedd, supra note 2, at 292.
23. Bearman, supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
26. Prior to Vanderschrier, several courts had discussed the value of implied war-
ranties, with a few judges favoring the doctrine. See, e.g., Lutz v. Bayberry-Huntington,
[Vol. 35
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glish cases, Vanderschrier involved the sale of an unfinished
home. The builder's failure to properly connect a sewer line had
caused substantial flooding in the dwelling, rendering it unin-
habitable. Lacking any American authority to justify awarding
damages to the buyer, the court stated: "In the law of England,
we find the rule to be that, upon the sale of a house in the
course of erection, there is an implied warranty that the house
will be finished in a workmanlike manner. '2 7 This rule, reasoned
the court, was the better measure of the buyer-seller relation-
ship. The court went on to adopt the "unfinished house" excep-
tion to caveat emptor and awarded damages to the buyer.
However, the court in Vanderschrier indicated it would adhere
to the doctrine of caveat emptor when a completed house was
involved.29
Shortly after Vanderschrier, the Washington Supreme
Court also adopted the "unfinished house" exception to caveat
emptor.30 Other jurisdictions, however, were less receptive to the
implied warranty theory, prompting many buyers to argue inno-
vative theories designed to circumvent caveat emptor rather
than force a confrontation. In Voight v. Ott,3' for example, the
purchaser bought a new home containing a faulty heating and
air conditioning system. He argued that the defective system
was personalty and thus covered by implied warranties accom-
panying the sale of such goods. The Arizona Supreme Court dis-
agreed and, in holding the appliances to be fixtures, upheld ca-
veat emptor in the sale of real estate.32
A major development in the evolution of the implied war-
ranty theory came in the 1960s when courts extended the doc-
trine to cover sales of newly completed homes. In 1964 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court rejected the so-called "limited warranty" of
Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1956).
27. 103 Ohio App. at 341-42, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
28. The courts subsequently advanced two reasons for limiting implied warranty
protection to situations involving the sale of unfinished homes. First, the buyer had no
opportunity for a complete inspection, and second, as a general rule one who contracts to
perform in accordance with his own specifications impliedly warrants the fitness of his
work. Haskell, supra note 9, at 640. See also Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64
S.E.2d 885 (1951).
29. 103 Ohio App. at 343, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
30. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
31. 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959).
32. Id. at 135, 341 P.2d at 928. See Jaeger, supra note 22.
1984]
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Vanderschrier and extended implied warranty protection to
buyers of completed homes in Carpenter v. Donohue:
33
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a
house which is near completion than would apply to one who
purchases a new home seems incongruous. To say that the for-
mer may rely on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is
recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.3
The idea was by no means novel; as early as 1957 New
Jersey Judge Waesche had urged most forcefully for such an ex-
tension in dissenting from Levy v. C. Young Construction Co.35
New Jersey soon followed Colorado and extended the implied
warranty to cover sales of completed new homes in Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc.36 Schipper was a landmark decision in sev-
eral respects. New Jersey became the second American jurisdic-
tion to extend the implied warranty to completed homes, 37 and
the opinion's harsh criticism of caveat emptor foreshadowed the
rapid erosion of the doctrine's predominance in home sales.38
More importantly, however, the decision extended implied war-
ranty protection to injured third parties not in privity with the
seller. The buyer in Schipper had leased the home to another
person eighteen months after its completion, and the lessee's
child was badly scalded by a hot water faucet not properly
equipped with a mixing valve. In focusing on the realities of
mass production, the court rejected the seller's privity defense
and permitted recovery. 9
Other major developments during the 1960s included the
extension of implied warranty protection to commercial build-
ings40 and to subsequent purchasers not in privity with the
33. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). Although the Colorado Supreme Court
awarded recovery based on fraud, it emphasized the completed home distinction made in
implied warranty cases. See Note, supra note 3, at 1057 n.24.
34. 154 Colo. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
35. 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1957), affd on other grounds, 26 N.J. 330, 139
A.2d 738 (1958). The majority of the court followed caveat emptor.
36. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
37. This was accomplished through implication, since the court ignored the com-
pleted home distinction. See Haskell, supra note 9, at 647-48.
38. Note, supra note 22, at 175.
39. 44 N.J. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328.
40. See Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 106 N.W.2d 59 (1960); Robertson Lum-
ber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966).
[Vol. 35
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builder-vendor. 41 By 1970 the implied warranty was recognized
as the modern rule,42 with caveat emptor largely rejected. The
scope of the warranty also continued to grow, extended by vari-
ous courts to include a house's water supply,43 septic tanks,44 air
conditioning systems, 45 and even side lot restrictions.4 The
seller's once strong position had been considerably diminished,
and his predicament was aggravated by judicial reluctance to
impose limits on the liability.47 By the early 1980s only two facts
were certain: The scope of the buyer's implied warranty protec-
tion was expanding and the seller, irrespective of fault, no longer
possessed a reliable, universally recognized defense against suits
brought by dissatisfied buyers. The situation was an ironic re-
versal of the one existing only twenty-five years before.
D. In South Carolina
South Carolina's treatment of the implied warranty in new
home sales illustrates the seller's mounting dilemma. Prior to
1968 South Carolina recognized no implied warranty in the sale
of new homes.48 Several times during that year, however, the
South Carolina Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with
the application of caveat emptor to home sales before finally
recognizing an implied warranty.
Dicta in Justice Legge's opinion in Frasher v. Cofer"9 hinted
at the court's growing disenchantment with caveat emptor: "The
majority [of states] exempt the vendor from liability for defects
in the premises existing at the time of the conveyance, in the
absence of an express warranty; but this rule has been the sub-
41. See Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Brown v.
Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979).
42. Wewak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970).
43. Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (1979); Mazurek v.
Neilsen, 42 Colo. App. 386, 599 P.2d 269 (1979).
44. Coney v. Stewart, 263 Ark. 148, 562 S.W.2d 619 (1978).
45. Putnam v. Roudebush, 352 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
46. Park v. Sohn, 90 IlM. App. 3d 794, 414 N.E.2d 1 (1980).
47. See, e.g., Sims v. Lewis, 374 So.2d 298 (Ala. 1979).
48. See Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968); Latimer v. Wharton,
41 S.C. 508, 19 S.E. 855 (1894); Lessly v. Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887).
49. 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968). For a discussion of Frasher, see Contracts,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. REv. 33, 35 (1981).
4751984]
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ject of much criticism. .... ,,50 Still, it was unclear at the time
whether Frasher signaled the court's willingness to create an im-
plied warranty in such a situation. A stronger indication came
later the same year in Rogers v. Scyphers.51 The court again sug-
gested in dicta that it would look favorably upon a cause of ac-
tion predicated on an implied warranty:
While no implied warranty is asserted or relied on in the
instant case, we have included in the foregoing citations several
cases wherein liability was predicated solely on the theory of
implied warranty, simply to show the trend of the law in this
field. The cases included which hold the builder-vendor liable
for negligence in construction ... reach, we think, legally
sound and just results.2
The South Carolina Supreme Court finally removed all
doubt by creating an implied warranty in new home sales in
Rutledge v. Dodenhoff.53 There the court held a builder-vendor
liable for the defective installation of a septic tank.5 4 Relying on
the dicta in Rogers, the court stated that "in the sale of a new
home by a builder-vendor, there is an implied warranty that the
house was built in a reasonably workmanlike manner and is rea-
sonably suitable for habitation." 55 Furthermore, the court re-
jected the builder's argument that compliance with municipal
regulations precluded implied warranty liability.58 The implied
warranty, reasoned the court, bound the builder absolutely for
the warranted qualities; any deficiency resulted in builder-ven-
dor liability regardless of fault.57 In the years since Rutledge,
South Carolina has emerged as one of the most progressive
states in protecting new home purchasers.
The supreme court did not resolve the issue of nonbuilder-
vendor liability"8 until six years later in Lane v. Trenholm
50. 251 S.C. at 115, 160 S.E.2d at 561.
51. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968). Rogers is discussed in Contracts, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. Ilv. 33, 35 nn.20-21 (1981).
52. 251 S.C. at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
53. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970). See Contracts, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 23 S.C.L. REv. 511, 513 (1971).
54. 254 S.C. at 410-11, 175 S.E.2d at 792-93.
55. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
56. Id., 175 S.E.2d at 795.
57. Id., 175 S.E.2d at 795.
58. For a discussion of the distinctions made between builder-vendors and other
476 [Vol. 35
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Building Co.5 9 Lane involved a buyer's suit against the devel-
oper of a subdivision for damage caused by a defective septic
tank. Rejecting the developer's nonbuilder defense, the court
held that the implied warranty springs directly from the sale
and does not require the buyer to rely on the construction ex-
pertise of the seller.60 Rather, the court reasoned that because
both the buyer and seller of a home can foresee the home's in-
tended use, namely habitation, the implied warranty operates to
fulfill the parties' reasonable expectation that the dwelling is
suitable for that purpose. 1 Also, the court in Lane relied exten-
sively on South Carolina's personalty law rule of caveat
venditor,62 a rule premised on the idea that a "sound price war-
rants a sound commodity." e
The South Carolina Supreme Court extended implied war-
ranty protection to subsequent purchasers in Terlinde v.
Neely e4 thus eliminating privity as a seller's defense. Citing Ed-
ward's of Byrnes Downs v. Charleston Sheet Metal Co.,6 5 the
court indicated that the correct inquiry was not privity, but
rather the foreseeability of the home's intended use:
In our mobile society, it is clearly foreseeable that more than
the original purchaser will seek to enjoy the fruits of the
builder-vendor's efforts .... By placing this product into the
stream of commerce, the builder owes a duty of care to those
who will use his product, so as to render him accountable for
negligent workmanship.
66
In Jackson v. River Pines, Inc.,67 however, the court de-
sellers of new homes, see McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New Home Construc-
tion, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 136 (1970).
59. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976). In Lane, the developer who constructed the
home did not originally intend to sell it. Instead, the developer delegated that responsi-
bility to the builder, who in turn executed a mortgage in favor of the developer. When
the builder went out of business, however, the developer foreclosed to protect his interest
and subsequently sold the home to the plaintiff.
60. Id. at 497, 229 S.E.2d at 728.
61. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
62. Literally, "Let the seller beware." BLAcK's LAW DicTIONARY 202 (rev. 5th ed.
1979).
63. 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
64. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
65. 253 S.C. 537, 172 S.E.2d 120 (1970).
66. 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
67. 276 S.C. 29, 274 S.E.2d 912 (1981).
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clined to extend implied warranty protection to sales of undevel-
oped land. 8 Citing Lane for the proposition that an implied
warranty arises from an intended use, the court reasoned that no
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was present
in the sale of unimproved land because such a sale does not in-
volve a clear objective. 9
Similar retrenchment was not evident in the court's next
pronouncement on the subject, Brown v. Sandwood Develop-
ment Corp.70 In Brown, the court held a vendor-subdivider of
residential lots liable to his purchasers for damage caused by a
negligently constructed drainage spillway.71 The court concluded
that under the circumstances the spillway transformed the
transaction into a sale of improved realty to which caveat
venditor applied. 2 In suggesting that a seller waives the protec-
tion of caveat emptor by taking any action sufficient to give the
land an intended use, Brown marks a significant qualification of
the Jackson decision. Thus, it appears that any improvement di-
rected toward preparing land for sale as a residential lot may
trigger implied warranty protection.
Brown is also significant in a second respect: it adopts the
discovery rule in any action involving negligence in building con-
struction. 3 Under this rule, the buyer is held responsible for
knowledge of defects only from the time he discovers or should
have discovered them. When this rule is combined with the rea-
sonableness test of Terlinde, which governs the duration of
builder-vendor liability for latent defects, the limitations period
of seller liability becomes uncertain, for discovery may occur at
any time after purchase.7
4
68. Id. at 31, 274 S.E.2d at 913.
69. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 913.
70. 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
71. Id. at 581, 291 S.E.2d at 375.
72. Id. at 585, 291 S.E.2d at 377.
73. Id. at 583, 291 S.E.2d at 376.
74. Comment, Liability of the Builder-Vendor Under the Implied Warranty of
Habitability - Where Does it End? 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 593, 602 (1979).
[Vol. 35
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III. THE SELLER'S DEFENSES
A. Introduction
As prevalent case authority indicates, the implied warranty
in new home sales is an uncertain doctrine, particularly from the
builder-vendor's standpoint. A buyer can be assured that courts
recognizing such a warranty will protect his expectations, but a
builder-vendor cannot ascertain the precise extent of his liability
or the efficacy of certain methods available for limiting that lia-
bility. Some commentators have suggested that the law in this
area has gathered too much momentum in shifting the burden of
loss from one party to the other, and that it now tends to work
an injustice on the seller. 5 The remainder of this Note will focus
on this criticism in evaluating the current status of defenses
most often asserted by builder-vendors in implied warranty
actions.
B. Possible Builder-Vendor Defenses
1. Disclaimers
Much of the litigation over implied warranties in home sales
has involved the seller's use of "as is" disclaimers. As a general
rule, the courts have not enforced these provisions, 76 but no
court has held disclaimers in home sale contracts to be invalid as
a matter of public policy."7 Thus, disclaimers in home sale con-
tracts are potentially of some -value to the cautious builder-
vendor.
Numerous courts have found that disclaimers are an accept-
able means of limiting vendor liability under an implied war-
75. See McNamara, supra note 2, at 49. Comment, The Implied Warranty of Hab-
itability in Texas-The Unanswered Questions, 10 TEx. TECH. L. Rlv. 975, 980 (1979).
On the other hand, other commentators have urged even more protection for home buy-
ers. See, e.g., Maldonado, Builder Beware: Strict Tort Liability for Mass-Produced
Housing, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 283 (1979).
76. See Comment, supra note 74, at 595.
77. Id.
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ranty.7 8 In most opinions, however, the particular disclaimer in
issue was held to be an ineffective bar to the buyer's recovery79
because stringent requirements have been imposed on their use.
Generally, a disclaimer is valid only if (1) it is clear and conspic-
uous;80 (2) it is specific about what it disclaims;81 (3) its wording
is sufficient to inform the buyer of the importance of the rights
he waives;82 and (4) the seller convinces the court that the dis-
claimer was a negotiated term clearly understood by the buyer.8
All doubts are resolved against the seller, and disclaimers are
strictly construed.
84
Much of the litigation considering these requirements has
focused on the disclaimer's language, rather than the parties'
conduct, and has involved standardized (general or "boiler-
plate") disclaimer provisions. A few courts have upheld these
provisions. In Tibbitts v. Openshaw,85 for example, the Utah Su-
preme Court found the following "as is" disclaimer sufficient to
bar the buyer's recovery against a builder-vendor because the
buyer failed to prove that the disclaimer did not reflect the par-
ties' intent:86
It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties
hereto that the Buyer accepts the property in its present con-
dition and that there are no representations, covenants or
agreements between the parties hereto with reference to said
property except as herein specifically set forth or attached
hereto.
87
The Texas Supreme Court upheld an equally broad disclaimer
78. See, e.g., Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981); Herlihy v. Dunbar
Builders Corp., 92 IMI. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
79. See, e.g., infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
80. Belt v. Spencer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 585 P.2d 922 (1978); Herlihy v. Dunbar
Builders Corp., 92 IMI. App. 3d 310,415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88
Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980).
81. Belt v. Spencer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 585 P.2d 922 (1978).
82. Id., Conyers v. Molloy, 50 IlM App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977).
83. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979); Tas-
san v. United Dev. Co., 88 IlM. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980); But see Tibbitts v.
Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967).
84. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
85. 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967).
86. Id. at 443-44, 425 P.2d at 161-62.
87. Id., 425 P.2d at 161-62 (emphasis added).
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clause in G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux.8 There the court stated:
The language in the contract that states "no... warranties,
express or implied, in addition to said written instruments"
could not be clearer. The parties to a contract have an obliga-
tion to protect themselves by reading what they sign. Unless
there is some basis for finding fraud, either actual or construc-
tive, the parties may not excuse themselves from the conse-
quences of failing to meet that obligation."9
Despite these decisions, it is difficult to formulate all-pur-
pose language immune from attack under all circumstances be-
cause the majority of courts have been less than receptive to
"boilerplate" disclaimers. One court has even stated that it
would be unreasonable under any circumstances to conclude
that a purchaser had waived his right of recourse for latent
structural defects.90 While no other court has gone that far, most
courts do require a much higher degree of specificity in these
disclaimers than is provided by standard boilerplate provi-
sions.91 Several courts, for example, have indicated that failure
to include the terms "warranty of habitability" or "warranty of
workmanlike performance" in a disclaimer will preclude its en-
forcement as a waiver.2 One court has also held that specific
disclaimer terms are not conclusive proof that a buyer has
waived his right of recourse against a seller, but merely serve as
rebuttable evidence that such a relinquishment was negotiated.
9 3
A few courts have demonstrated a willingness to look be-
yond a disclaimer's terms to the parties' conduct in determining
whether a disclaimer effected a contractual waiver. In Colsant v.
Goldschmidt,94 the Appellate Court of Illinois stated that merely
because a disclaimer was conspicuous did not mean the seller
had carried his burden of proving the home buyer had been
88. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
89. Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
90. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
91. See, e.g., Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 794, 799, 414 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1980); Crowder
v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978); Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24,
27-28, 327 A.2d 831 (1974).
92. Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 IlM. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224
(1980)(drawing a distinction between the coverage of these terms). See also Conyers v.
Molloy, 50 I. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977).
93. Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Il. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980).
94. 97 IlM. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (1981).
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aware, at the time the sale was consummated, that no implied
warranty attached. 5 Although the court in Colsant offered no
substantive guidelines as to what proof was sufficient to meet
this burden, it apparently contemplated the seller's use of ex-
trinsic evidence of the parties' negotiations. A similar implica-
tion arises from Sloat v. Matheny,96 in which the Colorado Su-
preme Court held that the seller's oral refusal to provide an
express warranty did not constitute a valid disclaimer.
9 7
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the use of printed dis-
claimers in home sale contracts involves much uncertainty. Sev-
eral states, perhaps wary of the confusion inevitably accompany-
ing litigation over the issue, have enacted strict enforcement
guidelines for disclaimer provisions. For example, a Maryland
statute provides:
Exclusion or modification of implied warranty - Neither
words in the contract of sale, nor the deed, nor merger of the
contract of sale into the deed is effective to exclude or modify
any implied warranty. However, if the contract of sale pertains
to an improvement then completed, an implied warrant [sic]
may be excluded or modified wholly or partially by a written
instrument, signed by the purchaser, setting forth in detail the
warranty to be excluded or modified, the consent of the pur-
chaser to exclusion or modification, and the terms of the new
agreement with respect to it.98
Most state statutes governing implied warranties in home
sale contracts were derived from the Uniform Land Transactions
Act (ULTA). 9 The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted the ULTA in 1975 to provide some
measure of uniformity among the states in the law of real estate
transfers. 100 The Act was intended to do for the law of real prop-
erty what the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) did for the law
of personal property.101 ULTA section 2-309 imposes implied
95. Id. at 56, 421 N.E.2d at 1076.
96. 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981).
97. 625 P.2d at 1034.
98. MA. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(d) (Michie 1981).
99. For a discussion of the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the warranties it
imposes, see Comment, Warranties in the Uniform Land Transactions Act of
1975-Progression or Retrogression for Pennsylvania?, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 162 (1975).
100. Id. at 162.
101. Kratovil, The ULTA: A First Look, 49 ST. JoHN's L. RaV. 460 (1975).
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warranties of suitability and quality of construction against
those engaged in the business of selling homes.0 2 Section 2-311
provides that these implied warranties cannot be disclaimed by
"general" language. 10 3 However, the ULTA and its official com-
ments permit specific disclaimers, if actually negotiated by the
parties, as well as exclusive remedies for breach of warranty.'
4
The ULTA also permits the use of a limitations period within
which a claim must be asserted, provided actual notice is given
to the buyer and the exclusive remedies do not fail in their es-
sential purpose.1 0° Thus, the ULTA substantially preserves the
bargaining position of the seller while implementing safeguards
for the protection of the buyer.
South Carolina has adopted no statutory provision gov-
erning the use of disclaimer clauses in real estate sales contracts,
nor has the issue arisen in any reported litigation. As a result,
the value of a disclaimer provision to builder-vendors in South
Carolina is uncertain.
Since many South Carolina implied warranty decisions cite
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) for analogous authority,106
the supreme court's treatment of disclaimer clauses in cases aris-
ing under the UCC may provide some guidance when dealing
with the unanswered questions surrounding the use of dis-
claimer provisions in home sale contracts. Perhaps the most im-
portant observation is that South Carolina courts strictly con-
strue contractual provisions limiting the seller's liability in sales
governed by the UCC.'0 7 Disclaimers are permitted, but in order
to be operative they must comply with the stringent require-
ments of section 36-2-316.10s Under this section, a disclaimer
provision must be written, conspicuous, and mention by name
the warranty to be excluded or modified. The parties' previous
course of dealing, usually not applicable in the sale of a home, is
102. ULTA § 2-309(b) and comment 1.
103. ULTA § 2-311(c) and comment 4. ULTA § 2-311 does not require conspicuous
language as does UCC § 2-316.
104. ULTA § 2-517.
105. ULTA § 2-521.
106. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31
(1974).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2),(3) (1976).
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also admissible to aid in ascertaining the parties' intent.09
Thus, if South Carolina courts continue to apply UCC con-
cepts in real estate implied warranty actions, it is possible that a
builder-vendor could limit his liability by using disclaimer provi-
sions similar to those permitted under the UCC. Although the
majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have adopted this
approach,110 the courts in these same jurisdictions have often
held such clauses unconscionable.' Given South Carolina's gen-
eral disfavor with disclaimers,112 the courts in this State would
probably reach the same result. In any event, it is possible that
such a disclaimer provision, if carefully drafted, would be effec-
tive in precluding a buyer's recovery; at least one court applying
the UCC by analogy has so held."'
No prudent builder-vendor should rely solely on a contrac-
tual waiver for protection from implied warranty liability."4 The
unsettled nature of the law, particularly in South Carolina,
makes the value of a disclaimer questionable at best. Neverthe-
less, a seller should routinely incorporate such provisions in his
sale contracts to obtain every possible benefit. Also, the cautious
builder-vendor should take appropriate steps to ensure that the
disclaimer achieves the high degree of specificity that other ju-
risdictions require. However, negotiation concerning specific dis-
claimer provisions could be self-defeating. It is unlikely that a
fully informed home buyer would willingly waive his right to re-
course against the seller for unknown defects without a substan-
tial concession in the price.
2. Limited Express Warranties
Builder-vendors have also sought to limit the implied war-
ranty through carefully drafted written warranties intended to
provide the buyer limited protection in lieu of the more expan-
sive implied warranty. Although one commentator views limited
express warranties as a viable alternative,115 a majority of the
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(3)(c) (1976).
110. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967).
114. Comment, supra note 74, at 596.
115. McNamara, supra note 2, at 50.
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courts ruling on the issue have refused to permit express warran-
ties to limit the protection implied by law.
In Tassan v. United Development Co.,"' the Appellate
Court of Illinois considered whether an express limited warranty
covering the same subject as the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity operated to displace the implied warranty and render a
buyer's claim for damages nonactionable.1" The express war-
ranty limited the seller's liability to defects reported within one
year after the date of purchase. Noting the absence of case law
directly on point, the court cited cases applying the UCC for the
proposition that "an express warranty covering the same subject
matter as an implied warranty of merchantability or an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not render ei-
ther of those implied warranties nonactionable."" 8 Further, the
court reasoned that since the implied warranty of habitability
covers only latent defects it would be inequitable to limit the
buyer's recovery to only those defects discovered within one year
of sale because most latent defects do not appear until much
later.1 9 Thus, the court rejected the defendant-seller's argument
that the express warranty contained in the sales contract re-
lieved it of any liability for defects reported after the one-year
period expired.120
The Appellate Court of Illinois also rejected the displace-
ment defense in Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp.1 21 There, unit
owners of a condominium complex brought suit against their
vendor for failing to repair defects in the common areas. The
court held that the one-year express warranty could not limit
the seller's responsibility because a contrary holding would per-
mit the seller to exclude the implied warranty without proving a
knowing and willing disclaimer.-2 2 The court reasoned that
under Illinois law an implied warranty may be disclaimed only
116. 88 IMI. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980).
117. Id. at 590, 410 N.E.2d at 910.
118. Id., 410 N.E.2d at 910 (citing Singer Co. v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 579
F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1978)); Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415
(1976)). South Carolina has often applied the UCC by analogy in deciding implied war-
ranty issues. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
119. 88 Ill. App. 3d at 590, 410 N.E.2d at 910.
120. Id., 410 N.W.2d at 910.
121. 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980). See also Colsant v. Goldschmidt,
97 M1l. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (1981).
122. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 316, 415 N.E.2d at 1228.
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through clear and conspicuous language, 23 and that the limited
express warranty did not sufficiently appraise the buyer of the
restrictions placed on the implied warranty of habitability.'24
In Omaha Home for Boys v. Stitt Construction Co., 12 5 the
Nebraska Supreme Court applied reasoning in rejecting a
builder-vendor's defense based on a one-year limited express
warranty. Unlike the other courts that have rejected the dis-
placement defense, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to find
the limited express warranty ineffective. Instead, the court de-
scribed the contract provision requiring the builder-vendor to
repair defects discovered within one year of substantial comple-
tion as "additional protection. '126 This interpretation was based
on a second contract provision which stated that the builder-
vendor's obligation under the contract "shall be in addition to
and not in limitation of any obligation . . . prescribed by
law. '127 Thus, although the basis of the opinion is unclear, the
court arguably allowed the contract provisions to control. In any
event, the Nebraska Supreme Court did not appear receptive to
the seller's attempt to limit the implied warranty's protection.128
The courts' widespread rejection of the displacement de-
fense lessens the limited express warranty's attractiveness to
builder-vendors. Even though the defense has achieved judicial
recognition in only two states, 29 one commentator has stated
123. See supra note 92.
124. 92 Ill. App. 3d at 317, 415 N.E.2d at 1229.
125. 195 Neb. 422, 238 N.W.2d 470 (1976).
126. Id. at 425, 238 N.W.2d at 473. The court stated that the limited express war-
ranty was "not exclusive and did not bar recovery for defective work discovered more
than one year after the date of substantial completion." Id., 238 N.W.2d at 473.
127. The second contract provision stated in full: "The obligation of the Contractor
under this Paragraph 13.2 shall be in addition to and not in limitation of any obligation
imposed upon him by special guarantees required by the Contract Documents or other-
wise prescribed by law." Id., 238 N.W.2d at 473 (emphasis added).
128. See also Elmore v. Blume, 31 IM. App. 3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (1975).
129. The only two jurisdictions in which courts have permitted limited express war-
ranties to displace or supplant implied warranties are Louisiana and Tennessee. In Slack
v. Inglehart, 386 So.2d 967 (La. Ct. App. 1980), the Louisiana Court of Appeal held that
under the Louisiana Code, parties to a contract may, by express agreement, limit or
diminish the implied in law warranty. Id. at 970. See LA. CiV. Con ANN. art. 2503 (West
1952). As a result, the litigants could have agreed to a limited express warranty, which
would govern the seller's obligations if a defect was discovered. However, Louisiana has a
unique civil law system-a fact that may explain that state's recognition of the displace-
ment defense.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has also recognized the displacement defense. In
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that the limited express warranty may offer the cautious seller
some protection, provided the warranty is equitable and states
that the vendor gives, and the purchaser accepts, the express
protection in lieu of any warranty implied by law.130 The greater
weight of authority, however, suggests that even a well-drafted
express warranty will not displace an implied warranty. Deci-
sions such as Tassan-which cite cases applying the UCC to re-
ject the argument-make the displacement defense unreliable in
South Carolina.181 If the seller decides to include a limited ex-
press warranty in the sales contract, however, the express war-
ranty should not include a short limitation period. Several
courts have focused on arbitrary and unreasonable time limita-
tion periods in rejecting the displacement defense, 3 2 and the
South Carolina Supreme Court has been similarly reluctant to
impose an arbitrary time restriction on implied warranty
protection. 133
3. Expiration
Builder-vendors often assert the expiration of the implied
warranty's protection as a third defense. 3 4 Under this defense
the seller argues that a statute of limitations bars all implied
warranty claims not brought within the prescribed period.
In Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc.,3 5 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court rejected a builder-vendor's argument that
the Colorado statute of limitations barred an implied warranty
Dixon v. Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1982), the court held that
the warranty of habitability is implied only when the contract is silent. Id. at 542. Fur-
ther, the court noted that "[b]uilder-vendors and purchasers are free to contract in writ-
ing for a warranty upon different terms and conditions or to expressly disclaim any war-
ranty." Id.
130. McNamara, supra note 2, at 50.
131. South Carolina cases decided under the UCC support this conclusion. In Mid-
Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31 (1974), the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that a repair clause in a contract for lease and possible sale of
refrigeration equipment did not exclude the seller's implied warranty of fitness under the
UCC. The repair clause required the lessor-seller to replace defective parts for no longer
than one year.
132. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
133. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
134. This defense is similar to the limited express warranty designed to terminate
one year after sale. See supra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
135. 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978).
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claim. The home in question was built in 1968 and sold to a non-
litigant shortly thereafter. The builder-vendor repurchased the
home in 1969 after the new owner complained of various defects.
The plaintiffs then purchased the home later that same year,
fully apprised of the previously discovered defects. Other defects
were soon discovered; and although the builder-vendor made mi-
nor repairs, the major problems were never remedied. 136 The
plaintiff brought suit in 1974 alleging misrepresentation and
breach of express and implied warranties. The defendant
builder-vendor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
Colorado statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs' claim.
137
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that the "plain lan-
guage" of the statute demonstrated the Colorado legislature's in-
tent to "limit only claims for personal injury or damage to prop-
erty other than the defective improvement itself."135 Based on
this interpretation, the court reversed both the trial court and
the court of appeals and held that the statute was inapplicable
to cases in which "the plaintiff seeks only to receive what the
builder promised to deliver, or damages to compensate him for
deficiencies in the final product."3 "
In relying on the "plain language" of the statute, the Colo-
136. Id. at 443, 578 P.2d at 638.
137. Id. at 444-45, 578 P.2d at 639. The Colorado statute of limitations, COLO. RV.
STAT. § 13-80-127 (1973), provided in pertinent part:
Limitation of actions against architects, contractors, engineers, and inspec-
tors. (1) All actions against any architect, contractor, engineer, or inspector
brought to recover damages for injury to person or property caused by the
design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of con-
struction of any improvement to real property shall be brought within two
years after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no case shall
such an action be brought more than ten years after the substantial completion
of the improvement to the real property, except provided in subsection (2) of
this section.
(2) In case such injury to person or property occurs during the tenth year
after substantial completion of the improvement to real property, said action
shall be brought within one year after the date upon which said injury
occurred.
(4) The limitations provided by this section shall not be asserted as a
defense by any person in actual possession or control as owner, tenant, or oth-
erwise of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improve-
ment constituted the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to
bring an action.
138. 194 Colo. at 445, 578 P.2d at 639 (emphasis in the original).
139. Id. at 446, 578 P.2d at 640.
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rado Supreme Court focused on the statute's failure to explicitly
impose a time restraint on implied warranty actions. The court
noted that other jurisdictions enacting similar legislation have
used language that suggested a time limit on implied warranty
actions and thus achieved a degree of specificity not apparent in
the Colorado statute.1 40 The court quoted as an example a Ne-
vada statute of limitations that provides a six-year limitation.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has also considered
the expiration defense. In Parsons v. Beaulieu,142 the plaintiff
brought an action against a contractor for damages resulting
from the installation of a septic tank system and the construc-
tion of a garage. The contractor argued that the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike construction customarily expired after one
year.143 The court disagreed, stating that the implied warranty
140. See id. at 446 n.5, 578 P.2d at 640 n.5.
141. The Nevada statute of limitations, NEv. REv. STAT. § 11.205 (1983), provides in
pertinent part:
Actions for damages for injury to person or property or wrongful death
caused by deficiency in design, planning, supervision of construction or con-
struction of improvements to real property.
1. No action in tort, contract, or otherwise shall be commenced against any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observa-
tion of construction, or the construction, of an improvement to real property
more than 6 years after the substantial completion of such an improvement,
for the recovery of damages for:
(a) Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observa-
tion of construction or construction of such an improvement; or
(b) Injury to real or personal property caused by any such defi-
ciency; or
(c) Injury to or wrongful death of a person caused by any such
deficiency.
The Colorado Supreme Court also cited IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-1 (Burns 1973), et
seq.; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-1.1
(West 1952). 194 Colo. at 446 n.5, 578 P.2d at 640 n.5. See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-
630, -670 (1976) (limitation of actions against architects, professional engineers or
contractors).
In Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1976), the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (1976) violated the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. Section 15-3-640 imposed a ten-year statute of limitations
on "all actions to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision,
observation of construction, construction of, or land surveying in connection with, an
improvement to real property. . . ." The court reasoned that no rational basis existed
for granting architects, engineers and contractors, as opposed to owners and manufactur-
ers, immunity from suit after ten years for negligence in the improvement of real
property.
142. 429 A.2d 214 (Me. 1981).
143. This defense is analogous to the one-year limited express warranties discussed
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does not expire at the end of an arbitrary time period.
144
Duncan and Parsons reflect the reluctance of courts to im-
pose arbitrary time constraints on the implied warranties accom-
panying new home sales.14 5 Instead, a majority of the courts ap-
ply a reasonableness standard to decide whether the implied
warranty was operative when the defect was discovered. 148 This
standard allows a court broad discretion to decide the question
based on the peculiar facts of each case. As the interval of time
lengthens between the sale and the complaint,, however, courts
are reluctant to find a breach of warranty147 because the implied
warranty's duration is not unlimited. 48
Thus, the reasonableness test permits at least a theoretical
limitation on the implied warranty's duration. Unfortunately,
the case law considering the reasonableness standard indicates
only what is not an appropriate duration for an implied war-
ranty. For example, the courts have universally rejected a one-
year limit,149 and they will most likely look with similar disfavor
on a five-year limit.5 0 One court has even rejected a six-year
time limit as an unreasonable warranty period for the installa-
tion of a septic system, an improvement which does not affect
the dwelling's structural integrity. 51 Based on these cases, the
warranty period for work affecting structural fitness appears
likely to approach, if not exceed, a decade.
New Jersey has sought to limit the life expectancy of the
implied warranty by statute. 152 The New Jersey statute provides
detailed time limits for the implied warranty attaching to three
facets of home construction: (1) a one-year time limit for faulty
workmanship or defective materials; (2) a two-year limit for
previously. See supra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
144. 429 A.2d at 218.
145. See also Matulunas v. Baker, 569 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Jeanguneat
v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395,
271 S.E.2d 768 (1981); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
146. See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
147. Parsons v. Beaulieu, 429 A.2d 214, 218 (Me. 1981).
148. Id.; see also Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla.
1978).
149. See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
150. See Wagner Constr. Co. v. Noonan, - Ind. App. , 403 N.E.2d 1144
(1980)(rejecting a five-year limit on implied warranty covering defective septic system).
151. Sims v. Lewis, 374 So.2d 298 (Ala. 1979).
152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3 (West Supp. 1983).
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faulty installation of furnishings; and (3) a ten-year limit for ma-
jor construction defects. A corollary provision provides for the
extension of warranty periods.153
The absence of both statutory and recognized nonstatutory
time limitations on implied warranty actions is most disquieting
for builder-vendors in jurisdictions such as South Carolina
where both the reasonableness standard1 " and the discovery
rule are applied to actions involving latent defects in improved
real property.1 55 Under the discovery rule the time period is
measured from the date the breach was discovered rather than
from the date of the defective installation or construction.15 6 Al-
though the discovery rule arguably reflects the"more equitable
and rational view,' 157 it nevertheless permits a significant exten-
sion of implied warranty protection because a court may con-
clude that the warranty was breached when the defect was dis-
covered. Thus, under this approach the duration of the implied
warranty is subject to no actual time limitation. Instead, any
time limit involved applies only to the period between when the
buyer discovers the defect and when he institutes suit. On the
other hand, a court could apply the reasonableness standard to
determine whether a defect is a breach of warranty or simply the
result of normal use and wear. The latter approach is perhaps
the better view.
Builders have responded to the absence of time limitations
on implied warranty actions through the Home Owner's War-
ranty (HOW) program. HOW is an alternative to common-law
implied warranties. Under HOW the builder "buys" the pur-
chaser a ten-year insurance policy against defects. The policy
costs approximately two dollars per thousand dollars of the
purchase price.' 58 The builder bears the responsiblity of repair-
ing any defects that appear during the first two years after the
sale. The insurer then assumes the responsibility for repairs for
the remaining eight years.159 The warranty is transferable to
subsequent purchasers, but the ten-year time limit remains in
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3(4).
154. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1981).
155. Brown v. Sandwood Dev. Corp., 277 S.C. 581, 583, 291 S.E.2d 375, 376 (1982).
156. Id. at 583, 291 S.E.2d at 376.
157. Id., 291 S.E.2d at 376; Mills v. Killian, 273 S.C. 66, 254 S.E.2d 556 (1979).
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force.160
4. Exercise of Reasonable Care
Several courts have applied a reasonableness standard to
decide whether a builder is liable for defects in the ground upon
which a home is constructed. In Stepanov v. Gavrilovich,16' for
example, the subdividers of a real estate tract successfully as-
serted a reasonable care defense in an action brought by builders
of defective homes. 162 The developers subdivided a housing pro-
ject on ground containing significant amounts of permafrost.
Prior to development, geologists employed by the developer had
conducted soil tests that failed to reveal the presence of
permafrost. 6 3 After the building contractor completed several
homes within the development, the permafrost began to thaw,
the soil settled, and the homes were damaged. The contractor
repurchased the homes from their buyers and brought suit
against the developer for breach of implied warranty and strict
liability.16 4 However, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a de-
veloper who exercises reasonable care in his work cannot be held
responsible for defects he could not have reasonably
discovered.6 5
This holding is motivated in part by our belief that its opposite
would lead to an illogical and unjust result. In enacting the
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act for Alaska, the legislature
clearly intended to impose a system of controls on the actions
of large-scale subdividers such as [the defendant]. One of those
controls is civil liability when subdividers fail to disclose to a
purchaser a physical characteristic of the subdivided land, such
as permafrost, which adversely affects the usefulness of the
land. But, when the condition is unknown to the subdivider, he
is liable only if it is one that he could have learned of through
the exercise of reasonable care.166
Although the subdivider, rather than the builder-vendor, as-
160. Id.
161. 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).
162. Id. at 35.
163. Id. at 32.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 35.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
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serted the reasonable care defense in Stepanov, the same de-
fense is arguably available to builder-vendors in suits brought by
dissatisfied buyers.1 67 In fact, the West Virginia Supreme Court
implicitly adopted such a rule in Gamble v. Main.6" There the
court held that the implied warranty did not extend to adverse
soil conditions that the builder could not have discovered by the
exercise of reasonable care.169
The Tennessee Supreme Court has also held that a builder-
vendor is not liable for damages caused by defects in the land.
In Zack Cheek Builders, Inc. v. McLeod,170 the court absolved
the builder of liability for damages caused by landslides.1 71 The
landslides were the result of a strong rain, a circumstance over
which the builder obviously had no control.7 2 However, the
Tennessee Supreme Court preferred to focus on the argument
that the implied warranty did not apply to disputes over the
land itself rather than on the substance of the builder's reasona-
ble care defense.17 3 In implied warranty cases Tennessee law re-
quires an allegation that the home itself is defective.174
Despite these decisions, a majority of the courts considering
the issue have rejected the reasonable care defense when the
builder's workmanship is at issue because such a defense is in-
consistent with the warranty concept. Under the majority rule
the builder-vendor is liable for defects in construction regardless
of whether he exercised reasonable care. In Waggoner v. Mid-
western Development, Inc., 5 for example, the South Dakota
Supreme Court held that a breach of the implied warranty is
167. Two points must be stressed, First, the Alaska Supreme Court's decision rests
upon purely statutory authority- The Uniform Sales Practice Act. Second, courts have
frequently held builder-vendors liable for the negligence of the independent contractors
they employ. See, e.g., Matulunas v. Baker, 569 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). On the
other hand, courts have often held independent contractors not liable to the builder. See
Wood-Hopkins Contracting Co. v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., 235 So.2d 548 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970) (Mason not liable for latent defects in bricks not discernible through exer-
cise of reasonable care).
168. 300 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1983).
169. Id. at 115.
170. 597 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1980).
171. Id. at 894.
172. Id. at 889.
173. Id. at 892. But see Hesson v. Walmsley Constr. Co., 422 So.2d 943 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)(implied warranty extends to both house and lot if sold as a package).
174. 597 S.W.2d at 892.
175. 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
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sufficient to justify recovery regardless of whether the seller is
free of negligence or fault.176 This "strict liability" position has
also found strong support in Oregon. In Chandler o. Bunick,'
the Oregon Supreme Court held that a builder is liable for dam-
ages caused by a breach of implied warranty even when he has
exercised all reasonable, or even possible, care.
17 8
South Carolina also favors a strict liability approach to the
builder-vendor's responsibility for supplying the warranted qual-
ities. As the South Carolina Supreme Court stated in Rutledge
v. Dodenhoff,179 "there [is] an implied warranty which [binds
builder-vendors] absolutely for the existence of the warranted




A growing number of courts have applied the reasonable-
ness standard to determine whether the defect involved is of suf-
ficient magnitude to constitute a breach.181 In applying this
standard these courts have implicitly adopted the "minor de-
fect" defense. Under this defense the builder's substantial per-
formance in tendering a home free of major defects satisfies his
implied warranty obligations. The standard of reasonableness is
used to determine whether the seller has satisfied the implied
warranty, 82 so the central question is whether the defect is suffi-
cient to trigger implied warranty protection, not whether the de-
fect exists.
18 3
In Wagner Construction Co. v. Noonan,'8 the Indiana
Court of Appeals held that a defect in the septic tank system
was serious enough to constitute a breach of the implied war-
176. Id. at 61, 154 N.W.2d at 806 (citing 77 C.J.S. Sales § 304 (1952)).
177. 279 Or. 353, 569 P.2d 1037 (1977).
178. Id. at 356, 569 P.2d at 1039.
179. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970). See Contracts, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 23 S.C.L. REv. 511, 513 (1971).
180. 254 S.C. at 414-15, 175 S.E.2d at 795 (emphasis added).
181. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
182. Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc., 406 A.2d 88, 93 (Me. 1979); Matulunas
v. Baker, 569 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
183. Wagner Constr. Co. v. Noonan, - Ind. App. -, 403 N.E.2d 1144 (1980).
184. - Ind. App. -, 403 N.E.2d 1144 (1980).
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ranty.185 However, the court also indicated that the implied war-
ranty covers only those defects serious enough to impair the
home's usefulness or value.
186
Similarly, in Taveras v. Horstman,87 the Wyoming Su-
preme Court rejected the builder-vendor's argument that the
implied warranty was not breached because the septic problems
involved were of minor consequence, but the court did imply
that the minor defect defense was available. ls Also, in Petersen
v. Hubschman Construction Co., 89 the Illinois Supreme Court
suggested that the builder's substantial performance may be a
possible defense to an implied warranty action. 90
The most persuasive early decision considering the minor
defect defense is Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc.9 ' In
Wimmer, the buyer brought an action to recover for damages
caused by a contaminated well and an inadequate water supply.
The seller argued that the defect was inconsequential and thus
insufficient to constitute a breach of the implied warranty. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine permitted the purchaser to re-
cover for a breach of the implied warranty of workmanship, but
stated that the minor defect defense may bar a purchaser's re-
covery under the implied warranty of habitability.9 2 Thus,
Wimmer is one of those rare decisions in which a court has made
a substantive distinction between the implied warranties of hab-
itability and workmanlike performance.
[The sellers'] argument confuses the implied warranty of habit-
ability, breach of which requires that the defect be of sufficient
magnitude to render the dwelling unsuitable for habitation,
and the implied warranty of workmanlike performance, which
requires only that a house be constructed in a reasonably skill-
ful and workmanlike manner. The test is one of reasonable-
ness, not perfection, the standard being, ordinarily, the quality
185. Id. at -, 403 N.E.2d at 1148.
186. Id. at -, 403 N.E.2d at 1149.
187. 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
188. Id. at 1282.
189. 76 M. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
190. Id. at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160. However, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
"[ift would be manifestly unjust to require the [buyers] to accept a house in which 'there
were defects in substance in construction' and to settle for damages." Id., 389 N.E.2d at
1159-60.
191. 406 A.2d 88 (Me. 1979).
192. Id. at 93.
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of work that would be done by a worker of average skill and
intelligence. 193
The South Carolina Supreme Court also recognizes a dis-
tinction between these two most widely recognized implied war-
ranties. In Rutledge v. Dodenhoff,194 the court held that "in the
sale of a new house by the builder-vendor there is an implied
warranty that the house was built in a reasonably workmanlike
manner and is reasonably suitable for habitation." 195 However,
to date this distinction is largely semantic because no South
Carolina case has yet to require a distinction comparable to that
expressed in Wimmer.
Regardless of the distinction between the implied warran-
ties, the minor defect defense appears viable, at least for the mo-
ment. After all, to hold the builder-vendor liable for even the
most minor imperfections in a new home is unjust. Furthermore,
the minor defect defense would discourage frivolous suits. Inevi-
tably, the issue will become what constitutes a "minor" defect.
To decide this question most courts will apply a reasonableness
standard, a standard which seldom benefits the seller. A major-
ity of the courts have applied the reasonableness standard to
benefit the buyer in determining both the duration of the war-
ranty 6 and the degree of care exercised by the builder.
19 7
6. Waiver
An express waiver of the implied warranty protection has
been discussed previously under both the disclaimer 98 and lim-
ited express warranty defenses. 199 However, even if a purchaser
has not expressly waived implied warranty protection, a court
may infer an implied waiver from patent defects and post-sale
delays.
193. Id. (citing Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29,
470 P.2d 593 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803
(1967)).
194. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
195. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795 (emphasis added).
196. See supra notes 145-154 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 161-80 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
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Waiver is closely associated with patent defects."0 Many
courts have held that implied warranty protection does not ex-
tend to patent defects-defects that the purchaser either knew
or should have known existed at the time of sale.21 The South
Carolina Supreme Court has paid only cursory attention to the
patent defect rule, stating that the implied warranty's objective
is to protect the innocent purchaser from latent, rather than
patent, defects.
202
The rationale behind the patent defect rule is clear. The im-
plied warranty's primary objective is to guarantee that the par-
ties' expectations are realized in the transaction.20 3 Thus, be-
cause patent defects are discoverable with "the exercise of
ordinary and reasonable care, 204 the buyer should be aware of
any defects when he tenders an offer. Theoretically, the buyer's
offering price includes an adjustment for all patent defects; and
the home he receives, though defective, will meet his expecta-
tions. Finally, whether a defect is latent or patent is frequently
uncertain because it is usually a question of fact.20 5
A court may also infer an implied waiver from a purchaser's
post-sale delay. In Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co.,206
the California Supreme Court held that a buyer must notify the
builder within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered the breach of warranty. 7 The buyer's failure to
notify the builder within a reasonable time bars the buyer's
right to recover for a breach of an implied warranty.208 In Pol-
lard, the purchasers were aware of substantial defects for nearly
four years before they notified the builder and filed suit.20 9
200. See Comment, supra note 75, at 981.
201. Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980);
Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 794, 414 N.E.2d 1 (1980); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill.
App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971);
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). See also MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 10-203(b) (Michie 1981).
202. Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980); Lane v.
Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 503, 229 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1976).
203. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 503, 229 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1976).
204. Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 590, 410 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1980).
205. Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316, 415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228
(1980).
206. 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
207. Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
208. Id., 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
209. Id., 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
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The court in Pollard based the notice requirement on a
statute that imposed a similar obligation in the sale of goods.210
The court noted that, when appropriate, other courts have often
applied statutory standards in dealing with common-law warran-
ties.211 The court justified the notice requirement as a "sound
commercial rule designed to allow the [builder-vendor] opportu-
nity for repairing the defective item, reducing damages, avoiding
defective products in the future, and negotiating settlements.)
21 2
Finally, the court held that the buyer's cause of action for
breach of implied warranty was barred because of his "unreason-
able" delay of nearly four years.21
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also considered
whether the parties' post-sale conduct constitutes an implied
waiver. In Terlinde v. Neely,21 4 the original purchaser executed
a release in favor of the builder after receiving compensation for
defects that were discovered after the sale. Several years later a
subsequent purchaser brought an action against the builder for
breach of implied warranty. The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
for the builder, thus implying that the original purchaser's re-
lease did not prejudice the subsequent purchaser's rights.215
Nevertheless, Terlinde leaves unanswered the question of
whether a release executed by the plaintiff constitutes a waiver
of an implied warranty cause of action.
7. Other Defenses?
The courts have recognized other builder-vendor defenses in
addition to the six most often-asserted defenses discussed above.
Foremost among these other defenses is the "intervening occu-
210. CAL. COM. CODE § 2-607(3) (West 1972).
211. 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652 (citing Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 899-900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699-
700 (1963); Frank v. J.J. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Cal. 2d 81, 88-89, 251 P.2d 949, 953
(1952)).
212. 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652. In Pickler v. Fisher, 7
Ark. App. 125, 644 S.W.2d 644 (1983), the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that adequate
notice does not require the utmost specificity about the defect's nature. Rather, the no-
tice need only apprise the seller of the breach and his opportunity to remedy it.
213. 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
214. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
215. Id. at 398, 271 S.E.2d at 769.
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pancy" defense. 16 This defense is based on the argument that
the implied warranty runs only from the builder-vendor to the
initial purchaser, not to any subsequent buyer. Although a ma-
jority of jurisdictions recognize this defense as a limitation on
the implied warranty,217 a select few, including South Caro-
lina,21 have expressly rejected it.
The basis of the intervening occupancy defense is lack of
privity between the builder and subsequent purchaser.1 9 In
other words, the second sale destroys the privity that existed be-
tween the builder and initial purchaser. However, the often-ap-
plied foreseeability standard supports the extension of implied
warranty protection to subsequent purchasers. In Terlinde v.
Neely, for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
The key inquiry is foreseeability, not privity. In our mobile so-
ciety, it is clearly foreseeable that more than the original pur-
chaser will seek to enjoy the fruits of the builder's efforts. The
plaintiffs, being a member of the class for which the home was
constructed, were entitled to a duty of care in construction
commensurate with industry standards. In the light of the fact
that the home was constructed as speculative, the home
builder cannot reasonably argue he envisioned anything but a
class of purchasers. By placing this product into the stream of
commerce, the builder owes a duty of care to those who will
use his product, so as to render him accountable for negligent
workmanship.
220
Another possible builder-vendor defense involves the com-
mercial sale limitation. This limitation is based on the argument
that the implied warranty attaches only to commercial sales.
Several courts have defined a commercial sale as the sale of a
home constructed solely for sale to a public consumer.221 Al-
216. See Scott v. First Inv. Corp., 556 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Casavant v.
Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 327 A.2d 831 (1974).
217. See Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972); Oliver v.
City Builders, Inc., 303 So.2d 466 (Miss. 1974); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209
S.E.2d 776 (1974); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
218. Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980). See also Gupta v. Ritter
Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
219. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980).
220. Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
221. Sims v. Lewis, 374 So.2d 298 (Ala. 1979); Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031
(Colo. 1981). Neither the Uniform Sales Act nor the Uniform Commercial Code extend
implied warranties beyond the commercial sale. Haskel, supra note 9, at 635.
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though the commercial sale limitation is widely recognized, sev-
eral recent decisions have diminished its possible effectiveness.
The Colorado Supreme Court considered the commercial
sale limitation as a defense to an implied warranty action in
Sloat v. Matheny.222 There the court stated that the builder-
vendor's original purpose in building the home was not control-
ling on the commercial sale issue.223 Instead, the court held that
the home was sold through a commercial sale, and thus the im-
plied warranty attached because the builder was engaged in the
home construction business and the buyer was a member of the
class the implied warranty was designed to protect.
224
The Alabama Supreme Court has also stated that the im-
plied warranty attaches only to commercial sales. In Capra v.
Smith,228 the defendant real estate developer argued that the
implied warranty applied "only to those in the business of
building and selling houses, much as the implied warranties in
the Uniform Commercial Code apply only to merchants. '226
However, the court disagreed and stated that the key inquiry
was not the defendant's business or profession, but "whether the
construction and sale was commercial rather than casual or per-
sonal in nature. '227 Since the defendant built the home in ques-
tion for sale to a prospective buyer, the court held that the im-
plied warranty attached even though the defendant could not be
classified as a builder-vendor. 228 Thus, both the Colorado and
Alabama Supreme Courts have narrowly interpreted the com-
mercial sale limitation to benefit the buyer.
Builder-vendors have asserted other arguments as defenses
to implied warranty actions. First, a builder-vendor may argue
that the implied warranty applies only to homes purchased after
222. 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981), rev'g 44 Colo. App. 1, 605 P.2d 71 (1980).
223. 625 P.2d at 1034. In Sloat, the defendant builder had constructed the house as
a home for his family, but financial troubles forced him to sell the house to the plaintiff.
Shortly after the sale the air conditioning system malfunctioned and the driveway pave-
ment began to crack. 625 P.2d at 1032. See also Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C.
497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (developer who did not originally intend to market the home
held liable under an implied warranty).
224. 625 P.2d at 1034.
225. 372 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1979).
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the warranty was recognized in the jurisdiction.22 9 Second, a
builder-vendor may argue that when a purchaser supplies the
plans and specifications used in the home's construction, the
purchaser impliedly warrants their adequacy and suitability for
the purposes for which they are tendered.2 3 0 Furthermore, at
least one court has held that a contract provision requiring the
builder to make on-site inspections does not nullify this implied
obligation.3 1 Under this argument the contractor is liable only if
he relies on the plans and specifications knowing them to be de-
fective.23 2 Third, a builder-vendor may argue that compliance
with municipal regulations precludes implied warranty liability.
Most courts, however, have rejected this argument.233
IV. CONCLUSION
Is the seller defenseless? The continued expansion of the
implied warranty protection afforded new home purchasers and
the uncertain status of the builder-vendor's traditional defenses
illustrate the magnitude of the modern builder-vendor's predica-
ment. With caveat emptor largely discarded, builder-vendors no
longer possess a universally recognized defense in implied war-
ranty actions. Although a few "defenses" have gained limited
recognition, they are generally applied in retrospect and thus
may not be used to limit builder-vendor liability when the sales
contract is negotiated. Furthermore, the courts have accepted in
theory, but rejected in practice, such prospective defenses as dis-
claimers and limited express warranties.
The builder-vendor's present predicament accentuates the
need for legislative action. In recent years the courts have made
the builder-vendor a virtual insurer of new home quality. Al-
though still in its infancy, the ULTA offers a sensible solution to
the present situation. The ULTA implements safeguards to pro-
229. See Leffler v. Banks, 251 Ark. 277, 472 S.W.2d 110 (1971)(implied warranty
applies prospectively only).
230. Housing Auth. of Texarkana v. E.W. Johnson Constr. Co., 264 Ark. 523, 573
S.W.2d 316 (1978); Miller v. Guy H. James Constr. Co., 653 P.2d 221 (Okla. Ct. App.
1982).
231. Housing Auth. of Texarkana v. E.W. Johnson Constr. Co., 264 Ark. 523, 530,
573 S.W.2d 316, 322 (1978).
232. Id. at 530, 573 S.W.2d at 322.
233. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
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tect the buyer's expectations while at the same time preserving
the seller's bargaining position by permitting the negotiation
and enforcement of disclaimer provisions. Until the seller's im-
plied warranty liability is clarified through the ULTA or a simi-
lar statutory scheme, the builder-vendor will continue to suffer
from inequities created by the courts' sometimes overweening
protection of new home purchasers.
Robert T. Strickland
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